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Dickinson: Conflict of Laws--Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Motorists

EDITORIAL NOTES

CONFLICT OF LAWS-JURISDICTION OVER NONRESIDENT MOTORISTS.-A few months ago the Supreme Court of the United

States in deciding the case of Hess v. PawloskiI upheld the
constitutionality of the Massachusetts statute2 which subjects
to the jurisdiction of its courts a nonresident who is not
served with process within the state but who has operated an
automobile within the state. Quite recently the case of Pizzutti
v. Wuchter, involving the constitutionality of a similar New
Jersey statute,3 was argued before the Supreme Court.
These cases, with the numerous comments thereon in newspapers and legal periodicals, 4 have directed attention to the
efforts on the part of some of our states to provide measures
for fixing upon nonresident motorists financial liability for
injuries caused by them5 and convenient methods of enforcing such liability in the courts.
That the upholding of the Massachusetts law has met
with almost universal approval is not surprising. To the
laymen, certainly, the result seems eminently desirable.
The wide use of the automobile, with the rapidly mounting
number of accidents, make imperative adequate measures
of control. To require one who has suffered an injury to
person or property at the hands of a nonresident motorist
to follow him to his own state in order to bring suit often
means, practically, the denial of a remedy. To the argument that such a law works too great a hardship upon a
nonresident because it requires him to come to a foreign
state to defend An action which may be without merit,
Judge Katzenbach of the Court of Errors and Appeals of
New Jersey replies :6 "This argument is easily answered by
saying that the burden upon the nonresident is no greater
than upon the citizen of a state who has suffered an injury
or damage within the state of his domicile at the hands of
a nonresident automobile owner -or operator and who may
1

274 U. S. 352 (1927).

2 MAss. Gnu. LAws (1921) c. 90 as amended by Mass. Stat. (1923) c. 431, §2.
. 1924 N. J. LAws, c. 232.
&76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 93; 41 HARv. L. REV. 94; 26 Mica. L. REv. 212. Meleski,
"The Case of Hess v. Pawloski," 7 BosToN U. L. REV. 243.
5Statute compelling owners of motor cars to provide security for possible liability
for injuries to persons or property by a bond or by insurance. held constitutional.
Packard v. Banton, 204 U. S. 140 (1924).
, In Pizzutti v. Wuchter, 134 Atl. 727 (N. J. 1926).
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be obliged to go to a foreign state, as, for example, California, to institute his suit for damages for an accident
which arose through the courtesy of his state in extending
to a nonresident the use of the highways. Such laws as the
one under consideration seem but the reasonable exercise
of the rights of a state for the protection of its own citizens.
If nonresidents feel the law harsh they can easily avoid its
operation, so far as they are concerned, by refraining from
operating their automobiles within the territorial limits of
the states which have enacted such laws."
It is not unlikely that the decision of the Supreme Court
of the United States sustaining the Massachusetts law will
give a new impetus to legislation of this character. Statutes
similar to that of Massachusetts have been enacted already
in Connecticut, 7 New Hampshire," New Jersey, 9 and Wisconsin.'
The constitutionality of the Wisconsin statute
has been upheld by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in the
case of State v. Belden'1 and a like result has been reached as
to its statute by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.12 With
the question of its constitutionality apparently settled,
many more states, it would seem, will avail themselves of
the benefifs of such a law. The opening of improved highways across our own state, with a re~ulting increase in the
number of nonresident motorists within our borders, brings
us face to face with the problem of protecting persons and
property within the state from injury by these nonresidents.
.A statute of the kind under discussion would go far toward
affording this protection.
The Massachusetts statute, which is typical of all such
legislation and which, because its constitutionality has been
settled, will likely be generally copied, is as follows :18
"The acceptance by a non-resident -of the rights and
privileges conferred by section three or four, as evidenced
by his operating a motor vehicle thereunder, or the operation by a non-resident of a motor vehicle on a public
way in the commonwealth other than under said sections, shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment by
7 1925

CONN. PuB. ACTS, c. 122.

a 1925 N. H. PuB. ACTS, c. 106.
. 1924 N. J. LAws, c. 232.
10

1925 Wis. LAWS. c. 94.

1 211 N. W. 916 (Wis. 1927).
1

Supra, n. 6.
Supra, n. 2.
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such non-resident of the registrar or his successor in office, to be his true and lawful attorney upon whom may
be served all lawful processes in any action or proceeding against him, growing out of any accident or collision
in which said non-resident may be involved while operating a motor vehicle on such a way, and said acceptance
or operation shall be a signification of his agreement that
any such process against him which is so served shall be
of the same legal force and validity as if served on him
personally. Service of such process shall be made by
leaving a copy of the process with a fee of two dollars
in the hands of the registrar, or in his office, and such
service shall be sufficient service upon the said nonresident; provided, that notice of such service and a copy
of the process are forthwith sent by registered mail by
the plaintiff to the defendant, and the defendant's return
receipt and the plaintiff's affidavit of compliance herewith are appended to the writ and entered with the declaration. The court in which the action is pending may
order such continuances as may be necessary to afford
the defendant reasonable opportunity to defend the action."
To the lawyer, the decision in the case of Hess v. Pawloski'4
has a significance not apparent to the layman. The constitutionality of statutes subjecting nonresidents operating
automobiles within the state to the jurisdiction of the
courts of the state has been attacked on the ground that
they violate those provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
forbidding the states to deprive any person of life, liberty
or property without due process of law, or to deny to any
person within their jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws. The alleged deprivation of due process is the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who is not
personally served within the state, who is not domiciled
within, nor a citizen of, the state and who has not consented
to the exercise of jurisdiction. Two answers have been
made by the courts to this charge of lack of jurisdiction;
(1) that a motorist driving within a state having such a
law, impliedly consents to the jurisdiction of its courts;15
(2) that "it is within the power of a state to provide by
law that the doing of such acts by a nonresident as the state
can prohibit shall subject the nonresident doing them to the
24

Supra n. 1.
Pawloski v. Hess, 253 Mass. 478, 149 H. E. 122 (1925).
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jurisdiction of our courts as to such actions as arise within
the territorial limits of the state." 16
The right of a state to forbid a nonresident to operate an
automobile within the state unless he first authorized a
state official to receive'service of process in actions brought
against him arising out of the operation of the automobile
within the state was upheld by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Kane v. New Jersey.17 A New Jersey statute forbade the driving of an automobile upon a public
highway of the state unless the automobile was registered
under the statute; and provided that a nonresident should
appoint the Secretary of State his attorney upon whom
process might be served "in any action or legal proceeding
caused by the operation of his registered motor vehicle,
within this state, against such owner." Kane, a resident of
New York, on his way from New York to Pennsylvania,
was arrested while driving in New Jersey. He claimed that
the statute was unconstitutional because it violated the
Fourteenth Amendment and also the provision of the constitution regulating interstate commerce. The conviction
was affirmed in the state courts 18 and.in the Supreme Court
of the United States, 9 Justice Brandeis saying :20 "We know
that ability to enforce criminal and civil penalties for transgression is an aid to securing observance of laws. And in
view of the speed of the automobile and the habits of men,
we cannot say that the legislature of New Jersey was unreasonable in believing that ability to establish, by legal
proceedings within the State, any financial liability of nonresident owners, was essential to public safety. There is
nothing to show that the requirement is unduly burdensome in practice. It is not a discrimination against nonresidents, denying them equal protection of the law. On
the contrary, it puts nonresident owners upon an equality
with resident owners."
To avoid the inconvenience resulting from requiring the
nonresident to stop at the state boundary and obtain permission to enter the state, the Massachusetts statute permits a nonresident to operate his automobile upon the
15Supra, n. 6.
27 242 U. S. 160, 87 S. Ct. 80 (1916).
18 Kane v. State, 81 N. J. L. 594, 80 AtI. 453 (1911).
19 Supra, n. 17.

'? 242 U. S. at 167.
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highways, but declares that by so doing he subjects himself to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state. May a
state thus subject him to the jurisdiction of its courts in
such actions although he has not expressly consented to the
exercise of jurisdiction? The Supreme Court of Massachusetts answered this question in the affirmative in the case of
Hess v. Pawloski21 and its decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States. 22 Whether the latter
court bases jurisdiction under the statute on implied consent or whether it rests it upon the power of reasonable
regulation is not clear. This is apparent from a reading of
the court's own language :n
"Motor vehicles are dangerous machines; and, even
when skillfully and carefully operated, their use is attended by serious dangers to persons and property. In
the public interest the State may make and enforce regulations reasonably calculated to promote care on the
part of all, residents and non-residents alike, who use its
highways. The measure in question operates to require a
non-resident to answer for his conduct in the State where
arise causes of action alleged against him, as well as to
provide for a claimant a convenient method by which he
may sue to enforce his rights. Under the statute the implied consent is limited to proceedings growing out of
accidents or collisions on a highway in which the nonresident may be involved. It is required that he shall actually receive and receipt for notice of the service and a
copy of the process. And it contemplates such continuances as may be found necessary to give reasonable time
and opportunity for defense. It makes no hostile discrimination against non-residents but tends to put them
on the same footing as residents. Literal and precise
equality in respect of this matter is not attainable; it is
not required. Canadian Northern Ry. Co. v. Eggen, 252
U. S. 553, 561-562. The State's power to regulate the use
of its highways extends to their use by non-residents as well
as by residents. Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610, 622.
And, in advance of the operation of a motor vehicle on its
highway by a non-resident, the State may require him to
appoint one of its officials as his agent on whom process
may be served in proceedings growing out of such use.
Kane v. New Jergey, 242 U. S. 160, 167. That case recognizes power of the State to exclude a non-resident until
the formal appointment is made. And, having the power
21 Supra, .. 15
22 Supra, n. 1.
28 274 U. S. at 256.
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so to exclude, the State may declare that the use of the
highway by the non-resident is the equivalent of the appointment of the registrar as agent on whom process may
be served. Cf. Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. v. Gold
Issue Mining Co., 9upra, 96; Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French,18
How. 404, 407-408. The difference between the formal
and implied appointment is not substantial so far as concerns the application of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."
In an able article in the HARVARD LAW REVIEW 24 Professor
Austin W. Scott has pointed out the undesirability of resting jurisdiction in such cases upon the theory of consent
and argues that there is a basis of jurisdiction which may
be stated as follows: "If a state may, without violating any
constitutional limitation, forbid the doing of certain kinds
of acts within the state unless and until the person doing
the acts has consented to the jurisdiction of the courts of
the state as to causes of action arising out of such acts, the
state may validly provide that the doing of such acts shall
subject him to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state as
to such causes of action." This, Professor Scott believes, is
the true basis upon which rests the exercise by a state of
jurisdiction over foreign corporations doing business within
the state. That jurisdiction is exercised over foreign corporations in the absence of real consent is admitted. Mr.
Justice Holmes has said 25 "But the consent that is said to
be implied in such cases is a mere fiction, founded upon the
accepted doctrine that the states could exclude foreign corporations altogether, and therefore could establish this obligation as a condition to letting them in."
That there is a basis other than consent for exercising
jurisdiction over nonresidents is recognized by the Wisconsi1 26 and New Jersey 27 courts in holding valid statutes similar to that of Massachusetts. These courts have definitely
adopted the theory that the defendant has, by acting within the state, subjected himself to jurisdiction based on the
power of reasonable regulation. In CONFLICT OF LAws, RESTATEMENT No. 2, also, we find recognition of this basis of
jurisdiction over an individual in the following words :28
3 HARV. L. RRv. 563 (1926).
39
248 U. S. 289, 293 (1919).
Supra, n. 11.
21 Supra, n. 6.
23 CONFLICT or LAWS RESTATEMENT, No. 2 (Am. L. Inst. 1926)
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"Except as limited in §90, a state may exercise through
its courts jurisdiction over an individual who has done
or caused to be done acts within the state, as to causes of
action arising out of such acts, if by the law of the state
at the time the acts were done a person by doing the acts
or causing them to be done subjects himself to the jurisdiction of the state as to such causes of action."
While this principle has not yet been generally accepted by
our courts, it is apparently gaining favor. It is clear, however, that its application will be greatly limited by the Constitutional provisions placing limitations upon the power of
the states to forbid the doing of acts within the states. If
a state cannot absolutely forbid the doing of an act within
the state, it cannot forbid the doing of such acts unless the
person doing the acts or causing them to be done has consented to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state, even as
to causes of action arising out of such acts.29 The Restatement therefore provides :o
"If a State of the United States cannot, without violating some constitutional limitation, make the doing of
certain kinds of acts within the State illegal unless and
until the person doing the acts or causing them to be
done has consented to the jurisdiction of the courts of
the State as to causes of action arising out of such acts,
the State cannot validly provide that the doing of the
acts shall subject him to the jurisdiction of the courts of
the State."
This limitation is inapplicable to the nonresident motorist,
for the state clearly has a right to make illegal the doing
of acts which endanger the public safety unless the person
doing the act first consents to the exercise of jurisdiction.
This, the United States Supreme Court holds, is a reasonable exercise of the police power. 31 But are there not many
other acts besides operating automobiles on the highways
which may be made illegal under the police power unless
the person doing the act first consents to jurisdiction?
Service on nonresident motorists may be but the beginning of
the exercise of jurisdiction over nonresidents in many more
classes of cases.
An interesting local question is suggested by the follow" Id. "Comment" following §§89, 90.

DOId. 90.

31Kane v. New Jersey, supra, n. 17.
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ing section of our own Code relative to service on carriers :32
"In a case against any common carrier (other than a
corporation) for any liability as such, it shall be sufficient
to serve any process against or notice to the carrier, or
any agent, or the driver, captain or conductor of any vehicle of such carrier, and to publish a copy of the process
or notice as an order is published under the twelfth section of this chapter."
It is not likely that this form of service has been commonly
resorted to, and the absence of annotation indicates that the
question of constitutionality of the act has never been
raised. Might it not be upheld on the basis of reasonable
regulation? If the operating of the vehicles of the common carrier endangers public safety, then under the police
power it can be regulated, and the state can provide that
the doing of such acts shall subject it to the jurisdiction of
the courts as to causes of action arising out of such acts.
There would be a question, of course, as to whether such
regulation was reasonable and whether the notice provided
was sufficient. The operating of numerous auto bus lines
into the state might make it desirable to resort to the form
of service on nonresident common carriers, not incorporated, provided by this section, which might be upheld as
a reasonable exercise of the police power.
-EDIMUND

C. DICKINSON.

BARNES' W. VA. CODE ANN. 1923, c. 124 §9.

THE CHANGING LAW OF COMPETITION-REHABILITATION
AFTER IMPEACHMENT BY CONTRADICTION.-When a witness

has been impeached by testimonial contradiction, the courts
do not always permit him to be rehabilitated by disproving
the alleged error. But when, as in the principal case, one
has been impeached by "editorial" contradiction, all the
authorities, including editorial writers, are unanimous in favoring not only a right of rehabilitation but a "no right" of
re-contradiction and a right of trial by battle in case of any
attempt. Accordingly it is herein proposed to rehabilitate
the policy against ruinous competition which was advocated by the writer in the last issue of this Quarterly' and
; Thomas P. Hardman, "The Changing Law
Another Word," 34 W. VA. L. QuAR. 123 (1928).

of Competition in
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